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IT is no wonder that President Wilson is rapidly becoming the authoritative spokesman of the whole anti-German combination. More than any other statesman in the Allied countries he possesses the ability to unite under one allegiance those Europeans and Americans who are determined that German military aggression shall not prevail and those who are equally determined that its downfall shall be made to contribute to the ultimate reign of international justice and the pacification of the world. In every new appeal to world public opinion he succeeds better and better in arousing the fighting spirit, so far as fighting is necessary, and he infuses his call to battle with an equally electrifying message to the forces of international democracy. His recent message to Congress is superbly effective both as the utterance of the commander in chief of an army and a navy, which is deeply convinced of the righteousness of the cause for which it has been obliged to fight, and as the political leader of a great nation which seeks to make its military preparation and economic sacrifices serve not only an immediate military object but a permanently binding and healing political object. He could not have been more emphatic in his declared resolution to do away with "this intolerable thing of which the masters of Germany have shown us the ugly face, this menace of combined intrigue and force which we now see as the German power, a thing without conscience or honor or capacity for covenanted peace." Neither could he have been more emphatic in insisting that the enemies of this intolerable thing clarify and define the objectives of their "conquest of peace by arms." In this message quite as much as in his speech on the eve of the American declaration of war, he has spoken "winged words" which will reenforce the moral élan and endurance of the Allied nations by helping them to put aside the irrelevant and disconcerting thoughts either of a weak peace or a merely vindictive war.

DURING recent weeks many conflicting opinions have been expressed as to whether it was advisable to have the war aims of the Allies re-stated at the Paris Conference. The President has himself resolved these conflicts. They were silent in Paris. He has been articulate and eloquent in Washington. He has answered the appeal of the Marquis of Lansdowne. He has restated the war aims of America in words, which must impose their authority on its allies, which will place behind a concert of military and economic power an indispensable harmony of political purpose. His statement of principle is comprehensive and indisputable in principle, yet adjustable in detail. The occupied territories must be evacuated and the damage done to the suffering populations must be repaired. In the east the world must be secured against the menace of the possible use by the German military caste of the resources in men and materials of Hungary, the Balkans and Turkey. In return he guarantees to Germany future security of national development, and he guarantees Austria-Hungary against impairment and dismemberment. If by any chance these objects cannot be secured by the war he threatens Germany with an economic and political isolation which would reduce her to

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a squalid and stunted future existence. Thus he uses to the best advantage all of his weapons. His message is a " political offensive " of the first order, which will save millions of lives and do the work of millions of American soldiers. If it can be made to reach the people of Central Europe, as it certainly will, it will be sure to increase their demand for peace. If it can be made to reach the people of Russia, it will prevent them from making a separate settlement and assure them of the fundamental internationalism of the Allied program. Thus with all its robust fighting spirit, it is a courageous attempt to accomplish a great work of political reconstruction by political agencies. He has accepted von Kuehlmann's challenge and met the Germans blade to blade on their own chosen ground. Unless we are much mistaken the result will be that " greater victory " for which democrats have been hoping and trusting.

THE President's recommendation of a declaration of war against Austria-Hungary is plainly dictated by the logic of events. The Austro-Hungarian forces operating against Italy are attacking our national interests in precisely the same manner and degree as the German forces operating in France and Belgium against our own army and the armies of our Allies. The Italian front has now become an integral part of the western front. In aiding Italy with loans, ships and munitions we had already given recognition to the fact that our neutrality toward Austria-Hungary could be only nominal. If we delayed in declaring war, it was only on account of the possibility that Austria-Hungary might be detached, at least in spirit, from her support of Germany. In so far as this possibility exists, the policy which dictated it need not be abandoned as the consequence of a declaration of war. From the military point of view, the cause of the Allies has now everything to gain and nothing to lose from the entry of the United States into the war against Austria-Hungary. From the political point of view the gains are no less obvious. The United States could have no standing in the general discussion of war aims and terms of peace so long as they remained neutral with respect to the problems of southeastern Europe, now universally understood to be the crucial problems of the war.

THE ebb and flow of victory around Cambrai would not be so perplexing to the layman if he would bear in mind the fact that both the Germans and the Allies hold in reserve enormous masses of men and guns quite capable of breaking the front at any points not defended as of supreme importance. The British, by surprise attack, produced a great dent in the German line; the Germans, by an attack also containing elements of surprise, forced the British to recoil from their most advanced positions. Both sides have taken thousands of prisoners and many guns, but the advantage in these respects appears to lie with the British. Both the British attack and the German counter-attack were costly in lives, but the German counter-attack appears to have been vastly the more costly. The net results of the two operations is registered, not so much in the relative strengthening or weakening of the actual battle lines, as in the relative drain upon the reserves in the rear. If such fighting were continued indefinitely, one side or the other would finally find itself too greatly depleted in reserves to stop the breaches in its line made by the enemy. As the German reserves are obviously the more easily exhaustible, the outcome of such fighting would naturally be the retirement of the Germans to a shorter line, to be held until reserves had again become exhausted, when further retirement would become necessary. It is a slow process of victory, but sure.

THE attempt of the Bolsheviki Committee in Petrograd, which calls itself the government of Russia, to negotiate an armistice adds another to the array of formidable obstacles which stand in the way of any satisfactory ending of the war. By tending to release the German troops on the eastern front it increases the military strength of the Central Powers, and enables them to prosecute the war much more vigorously on the other fronts. Thus it temporarily converts Russia into the military accomplice of Germany and strengthens those factions in Berlin which still strive for military victory. It is vain for Trotzky to protest that an armistice does not imply a surrender to German autocracy. That is precisely what it does mean. He and his associates are abandoning the only weapon which gives either the Western or the Central Powers any reason to consult Russia or to pay attention to her wishes and desires. An armistice has all the effect of a separate peace, and far from encouraging a working class revolution it will have the effect of strengthening the military extremists in all the belligerent countries. Nothing could better expose the political ineptitude of American pacifists than the action of the People's Council in New York in approving both the armistice in Russia and the plea of the Marquis of Lansdowne for a new definition of Allied war aims. The effect of adopting Lord Lansdowne's proposal would be to increase the chance of defeating Germany and of obtaining a satisfactory peace. The effect of the armistice is to diminish the chance of beating Germany and consequently to prolong the war.

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RARELY has an American government shown a wiser moderation than in the handling by the State Department of this latest Russian crisis. It has consistently refused to make the Russian nation responsible for the betrayal by the Bolsheviki of the common cause, and it has persistently acted and talked as if Russia could eventually be saved for the Allies. In adopting this attitude and apparently in preventing the threatened withdrawal of the diplomatic representatives of the Entente from Petrograd, it has kept Russia within the radius of Allied influence. It has prepared the way for the return of a government in Russia which will repudiate the armistice and abstain from aiding Germany even though it may not be of much military assistance to the enemies of Germany. Our knowledge of the internal conditions of Russia is so slight that not even a plausible prediction can be made as to the probability of such a resurrection. The Bolsheviki in pursuing an active peace policy are satisfying an intense longing of the Russian people, and it may be some time before they can be dispossessed. But in the meantime the Allies can encourage the Russian opponents of the Bolsheviki and prepare the way for the return of a Russian national government by taking a somewhat vigorous action along the lines of the President's policy. They can issue an appeal to the Russian people, explaining the disastrous effects of an armistice and doing something by a restatement of their war aims to prevent the Germans from appropriating the increasing popular craving for peace.

HAD woman suffrage no chance whatever in the present Congress there might be some political excuse for extreme tactics. As it is, there is nothing that suffrage has so much to dread at this hour as the establishment of a false position around which the antagonism in Congress can readily crystallize. The passage of the federal amendment is due this session. There is every reason to believe it can be secured. Victory in New York gives an entirely different complexion to the importance of suffrage claims in practical politics, and the House must follow the Senate in putting rollers under their suffrage committee. The strength of women's claim on Congress does not, however, depend on their new voting power. It depends greatly on the cool and restrained nature of the campaigns that have succeeded, on the prestige that has been earned for suffrage in the heart of the country by the serious and considerate manner in which women's rights have been urged. It is this that has banked up credit for women in their appeal to Congress; and to repudiate women who have won on such a basis among the voters is more than most representatives will care to risk.

THE Woman's Party have the power to forward suffrage on these lines, backed by this prestige, or they can elect to throw away this prestige and destroy all that has been gained by the simple method of renewing their policy of intimidation. The policy of intimidation is in some ways the heroic one. There is a certain heroism in joining issue with the government on every conceivable point, to punish the government for its failure to do what it should. At this moment, however, there is no doubt that American sympathy is much more engaged by the pickets who are risking their lives against a sure enemy near Cambrai than by the pickets who are risking the President's life, far more than their own, near the White House. This is the rough logic by which any serious clash with the government is bound to be judged, and the opposition to suffrage in Congress will gratefully seize on it as a sound national reason for locking the gates to women voters. The Woman's Party ought to weigh the consequences now. Their grievances in prison have been substantial, but they were self-sought, and this is not the hour for winning suffrage by exposing the wounds that have been deliberately invited. It is the hour for pursuing the campaign by the legitimate methods that are promising to bear fruit.

MUCH is said about the need of American propaganda in Russia. Publicity would help, but those who are successful in using it know that, after all, actions speak louder than words, and that if you wish to convince the public of the genuineness of your article, you must begin by being sure that your article is in every respect genuine. One of the first things Russia did after discarding the Romanoffs was to grant the suffrage on equal terms to all adults, men and women alike. For more than half a century, free America has failed, as a nation, to listen to the petition that the vote be given to women. If the present session of Congress should submit the Susan B. Anthony amendment to the states, it would do more to convince Russia of our democratic intentions than millions spent in pamphlets and moving pictures.

DURING the present session of Congress the Republican minority, it is already sufficiently evident, will not be satisfied with a passive part. Its support of the government in the prosecution of the war does not necessarily imply support of the way in which the war is being prosecuted, and its leaders will undoubtedly be looking for opportunities to convict the administration either of inadequacy in its preparations, of blunders or of extravagance. They will seek to convince the country of Democratic incompetence, because a

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congressional election is pending next fall, and the Republicans need to furnish the voters with sufficient reason for discriminating against Democratic candidates. The Democrats will denounce such criticisms as unpatriotic, but the protest will not avail, provided the Republicans can fasten on serious mistakes which either might have been avoided or might have been more quickly remedied. In America unlike the other belligerent countries, the party which was in power at the outbreak of the war has remained in power and has not shared with its opponents responsibility for its conduct. The Republicans, consequently, are entitled to oppose and to criticize. It remains to be seen whether they, as a result of their criticisms, merely embarrass the administration or whether they seek to use it for the improvement of the strengthening of the organization of the country for war.

The Conduct of the War

A NEW phase is about to begin in the relationship between the American public and the conduct of the war with Germany. During the summer and fall the administration has been occupied with preliminary preparations, and during the process of this work there has been little disposition on the part of public opinion to criticize its methods. The colossal size and difficulty of the task of substituting a war for a peace organization was recognized, and public opinion was willing to grant to the administration not only all the resources and powers it demanded, but a sufficiency of time in which to discover how the increased resources and powers could be put to the best use. With the reassembling of Congress, however, a somewhat different disposition is bound to find expression. From now on public opinion will be applying to the work of the administration a more exacting standard. It will be inquiring what the results are likely to be of the way in which the administration has been conducting the war; and in so far as these results are disappointing, there will be unloosed a flood of more or less just and relevant criticism. The disposition to criticize will, moreover, be intensified by the increasing inconveniences and sacrifices which the war will soon impose on every member of the community. Hitherto its cost has been small except to those who have joined the army and the navy. But hereafter war efficiency will call for much more general popular sacrifices. It will call for a wide-spread shifting of capital and labor, which must be carried out without much consultation of the preferences and interests of its victims. Industries will have to be temporarily abandoned and their workmen transferred to other occupations and places. There will be demanded a really heroic measure of economy and self-denial on the part of all classes. Under such conditions the American public will naturally apply to the work of the government the more exacting standards upon which the government is itself obliged to insist. It will demand a full measure of accomplishment, even though these results cannot be obtained without a reorganization of administrative practices and methods no less drastic than the reorganization of industry.

As it happens, critics who demand a full measure of achievement will have some reason to be dissatisfied with the results which will be actually obtained. The preparations of the administration to make American hostility to Germany count during the spring and summer of 1918 have been considerably and unnecessarily retarded. Partly because of the delay in getting the ship-building program under way, partly because of the use of antiquated methods in the purchasing departments of the government and partly because of hesitation in dealing promptly, comprehensively and decisively with such problems as the railroad break-down, the determination of prices of basic commodities and the labor unrest, supplies and materials will not be produced in sufficient quantities and transported to Europe with sufficient celerity to assure, during next spring and summer, maximum efficiency to the French, British and American armies. It is obviously impossible, and it would be undesirable if it were possible, to state in what specific ways and to what extent the military operations of the Allies will be hampered by the delay in American preparations. It is enough to feel sure that the delay is a fact, that during the next few months the fact will be imprinted on the mind of the public, and that the public will not be satisfied with excuses, based upon the colossal size and difficulty of the task. The excellent intentions and the hard, devoted work of the men engaged in making these preparations is written all over the record; but in war good intentions and hard work cannot be considered any sufficient excuse for a partial failure to deliver required results. The administration will be tested by the measure in which it produces success or failure, and considering the generosity with which it was equipped with new powers and abundant resources its responsibility for its failure to deliver cannot be diminished or escaped.

In the present situation, however, it is not the unnecessary delays which have occurred in building ships and in contracting for supplies that will absorb public opinion. The public will be more interested in finding out whether such delays are likely to continue, and whether any sufficient steps have been taken to prevent their continuance. It may even look with good-natured toleration on a

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failure to obtain the expected results, provided the failure is recognized, is traced without prejudice to its source, and adequate remedies devised. It will make allowance for the impossibility of shifting from a slack, loose and easy-going peace organization and economy, to a tense, exacting and highly centralized war organization without committing serious and costly mistakes. No other belligerent nation has avoided the pitfalls which its own negligence, greed, weakness and irresponsibility in times of peace has dug for it in times of war; and since our characteristic failings have certainly been as numerous as those of the other belligerents, the penalty for them in economic and military incapacity was bound to be severe. But although public opinion will make allowance for blunders which might have been avoided, it will be ruthless with any attempt to conceal them or with any disposition to stick to them after their serious consequences have been exposed. It will ask the other departments of the government to do what Chairman Hurley has done in the case of the Shipping Board. It will ask them to prove their regret for past failures and their intention of doing better in the future by making in their own departments all the changes in organization, policy and personnel which are necessary to a more abundant measure of success.

Manifestly, however, the needed efficiency in war preparation, while it apparently demands considerable changes in the direction and methods of certain departments, will not be secured merely by such restricted reforms. In so far as the failure of the administration can be traced to one major cause, it must be attributed to the lack of foresight in its plans and momentum in their execution. It has allowed the costly consequences of some radical defect in the older machinery, such as the disorganization of the railroads and the labor supply, to accumulate without any attempt to deal with the trouble except by patchwork. The result has been that as the strain increased, more and more energy was consumed in patching and less and less effect obtained from it. The government has been reluctant to act until some part of the machinery broke down and then it acted no more than it could help. There may be something to be said for such a method of administration in times of peace. It at least secures for a political leader a larger measure of public interest and support, when he comes to work out his remedies. But it is fatal in war, particularly in a war whose prosecution needs for its success an unprecedented concentration of all the moral and physical resources of the country. A nation succeeds in war almost entirely by its ability to foresee and to plan and to execute its plans with speed and energy.

The manifest symptom of the lack of foresight and consequently of drive in the war organization of the government has been its failure to use either within particular departments or among them any effective boards of economic strategy. The Council of National Defense has been disqualified by many defects from serving as a strategy board. Its members were executives rather than men who had the time and the information and the point of view to act as general counsellors. If the President had attended the Council meetings he might have pulled them together, but in his absence its function was that of an inter-departmental board, each member of which was interested chiefly in the work and claims of his own department. The Council, moreover, did not contain representatives of the boards or bureaus who were dealing with such essential war services as shipping and food. The War Industries Board was an attempt to remedy this weakness, but just as the Council was composed of executives who were necessarily defective as counsellors, so the War Industries Board was composed of advisers who were deprived of executive power. Such an organization necessarily lacked brain power, and there was no sufficient communication between what brain power it had and its organs and hands. Just as there has been no inter-Allied authority to decide which of several conflicting claims on American resources the American government should satisfy, so there was no American authority to decide which should be preferred among the claims made by different departments or different bureaus in the same department upon the power of the country to produce or transport supplies. The consequence has been not only an increasing congestion of acute problems which defied solution by any existing official body, a hideous waste of time in abortive inter-departmental consultations, the consequent exasperation of business men who needed to have decisions made and a general atmosphere of maladjustment, frustration and delay. Even though every official was working devotedly and intelligently, within the limits of his own opportunity, there was no corresponding drive in the whole machine and no sufficient speed in gathering results.

An attempt has recently been made to provide a remedy for this defect of organization. A war cabinet has been created, consisting not only of the six members of the Council of National Defense, but in addition the Secretary of the Treasury, the Food and Fuel administrators, and the chairmen of the Shipping and War Industries Boards. We doubt whether this new body as now organized will do the trick. While it is promising as an evidence of a growing understanding of what is lacking, it will not remedy all the defects of the old Council

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of National Defense. The Secretaries of War and the Navy will still be embarrassed by their double function of managing a supply as well as a fighting department, and they cannot give much time to strategic questions or approach such questions disinterestedly until they consent to the substitution of a munitions department for the existing Advisory War Industries Board. There is only one way to secure the volume of supplies needed by the military forces of America and the Allies, which is to place the responsibility for producing them in the hands of a general munitions department, the several bureaus of which will not compete against one another and will act upon a coördinated policy with respect to priority, prices and labor. There is only one way to assure the transportation of military supplies as well as those needed by the civil population, which is to appoint a national railroad administrator. If these new executive departments were created, and if they were given representation on the Strategy Board, together with those already mentioned, then the Board would require only one more addition to the membership to become the brains of an American war organization. All these executive chiefs would derive their powers chiefly from the President and they could not sit effectively in council except with his active consent and coöperation. The President himself should be present at their meetings in order to guide and coördinate their deliberations and endorse their decisions. By no other means can the war organization be properly linked up with the man in whom the whole war power of the government necessarily resides.

Aid and Comfort to the Enemy

THE political objects of the war can no longer remain forbidden ground for thought and discussion. The governments of the world are to be held answerable to their peoples for their political, as well as their military conduct of the war. These are some of the obvious implications of the reception of the Lansdowne letter, in England and America. At first, as was natural, the military extremists joined in a cry of betrayal of the Allied cause. Lord Lansdowne had stabbed the Allies in the back. He had brought confusion into the Allied plans for unity. He had created in Germany an impression that England was weakening. Above all, he had shaken the determination of America to throw her whole energies into the work of winning the war. As Lord Lansdowne could not be accused of pro-Germanism, attempts were made to explain away his action on grounds of his Toryism, on grounds of age or physical infirmity.

Such was the immediate reaction. Very quickly, however, the bitter-enders and never-enders of the American press appear to have been struck by the fact that the French press was extremely guarded in its comment, and the Northcliffe papers were by no means having a monopoly of British opinion. It became clear that Lord Lansdowne spoke not for himself alone, but for a powerful body of public opinion, not in England alone. His proposals, it became evident, could not be ignored, nor disposed of by the cocksure methods of the editorial desk. They were recognized to be of weight enough to command consideration in the most authoritative quarter in the Allied world. If Lord Lansdowne was to be " answered," it was plain that the answer had to come from President Wilson. And whether President Wilson chose to answer or not, the question of Allied war aims had been thrown before the peoples for discussion.

And this is in itself an evil, according to the extremists. Grant that we have given up the idea of a knock-out blow, as practically everyone has done. Grant that we no longer hope to impose punitive indemnities, but merely insist upon reparation for such manifest wrongs as the invasion of Belgium. Grant that we have no intention of trying to degrade Germany from her position as a great Power, or to handicap her in her commercial life after peace has been restored. Grant that we are ready to abate many of the territorial pretensions upon which the Allied Chancelleries agreed at the outset of the war. Grant that the international order we mean to establish for our security will assure to Germany the same security that the other nations enjoy. Is it not dangerous to announce the moderation of our real aims to a Germany still undefeated? This is the concrete issue raised by the Lansdowne letter.

We take it for self-evident that in each of the major belligerent countries opinion tends toward two opposite poles. In every country there are those who would continue the struggle until the enemy was wholly broken, demoralized, ready to accept an abject peace. At the opposite extreme are those who would make peace immediately, with small regard to the nature of the terms. Between the two poles lies the great bulk of opinion, ready to endure such additional sacrifices as may be required to safeguard vital national and world interests, but anxious about the effects, domestic and international, of an indefinitely prolonged contest. There are indeed a few who assert that Germany is an exception to the rule: that all Germans, with practically no exceptions, are of the extreme, irreconcilable party of military adventure. This assertion, however, is scarcely worth taking seriously.

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Even such meagre information as the various censorships allow to filter out of Germany establishes clearly the fact that German opinion, from the outset of the war, has been far from unanimous, and that at the present day differences in opinion as wide as those between La Follette and Roosevelt not only obtain, but find authoritative expression.

The military extremists of Germany can take no possible comfort from any published evidence that the designs of the Allies do not involve the dismemberment and humiliation of Germany. They believe that if Germany persists, she will win this war. They point to the collapse of Russia and the proof of Italian weakness. They still vastly underestimate the endurance of the French, the determination of the British, the efficiency of America. If they can induce the German people to endure through to the end, they believe that Allied resistance will collapse. In this event Germany would be left in a position of power such as no modern nation has ever held. Indeed, something like world empire would lie within their grasp. This is the stake for which they are playing. What the game will cost, they recognize, is many more years of war and the sacrifice of millions of German lives. What they conceive to stand between them and the realization of their glorious dream is the reluctance of the millions to pay the price in their lives. With regard to the Lansdowne letter they would agree perfectly with the reported sentiments of our own Dr. Hillis. "I abhor the letter because it lays too great stress on human life. What is human life? All the great things of the world have been done through martyrdom."

What gives aid and comfort to the most irreconcilable and ambitious of the enemy is not the expression of moderate views from beyond the hostile lines. Such views inevitably raise in the minds of those who must pay in their own lives or the lives of their sons, the question whether the objects to be attained by indefinite fighting are worth the cost. Such views tend to produce political indiscipline. They force the militarist to divide his energies between keeping up the political morale at home and the military morale on the fighting front. If the German militarists could have dictated Lord Lansdowne's letter, they would have substituted for its spirit of reconciliation such a spirit as animates Dr. Hillis and his kind. For, however weary of war the German people may be, they are not so weary that they will not continue to fight rather than yield ground to hostile armies bent on the destruction of Germany. All the militarists of Germany ask is that the people be induced to fight on. Their ultimate hope, they believe, will then be realized. Such a pronouncement as Clémenceau's, that his sole war aim is victory, served the militarist's turn well. Here was concrete evidence that the German people could expect no mercy at their enemy's hands. The best that the militarists can do with the Lansdowne letter is to make a pretence that it indicates England's weakness, a pretence that will carry only to those whose will to continue the war to a military decision was already firmly established.

To the German military imperialists the Lansdowne letter is simply a "peace offensive," more dangerous by far to their cause than General Haig's military offensive at Cambrai. We know what our own militarists think of "peace offensives," launched from the German side. Authoritative statements of inordinate German ambitions, demands for indemnities, annexations, exclusive economic spheres, are eagerly welcomed by our own bitter-enders. They demonstrate to the masses who must pay that the overthrow of Germany is worth the price—whatever price. Statements exhibiting German tendencies toward moderation are received with disgust and rage. They impair our political morale, so it is constantly asserted, and increase the danger that peace, when it comes, will be a "German peace."

And in fact it must be admitted that the side which appears first in the field with counsels of moderation that must command the attention if not the assent of all intelligent persons within the opposing camp, does drive a wedge between people and government, does weaken the political morale of the opposing side. Lord Lansdowne's proposals, while safeguarding the essential aims of the Allies, strips them of all that made them utterly inacceptable to the German people. But for his timely intervention, we should almost certainly have had very shortly to meet a new German political offensive, presenting the essential German aims stripped of all that would compel their instant rejection by the Allied peoples.

Between the essential aims of Germany and those of the Allies lies the margin between a German peace and such a peace as the democratic nations are striving to establish. If the Allied aims are to prevail, something more than military efficiency is required. What is required above all from Allied statesmanship is a political efficiency that keeps before a world weary of war, not war aims vague and undefined and under suspicion of aggressive and revengeful purposes, but war aims of such manifest moderation and justice that the Allied peoples can cheerfully endure whatever their realization may cost, while the hostile peoples can not afford to resist them to the end. What the Allied cause most needs is "peace offensives," conducted with a boldness and skill that the enemy can not match.

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The President's Commission at Bisbee

BISBEE, Arizona, is at the heart of one of the largest copper producing areas in the world. As the administrative headquarters of the Copper Queen branch of the Phelps Dodge corporation it is the virtual capital of the copper industry of the Southwest. In times of peace the Copper Queen is an important barometer of the nation's industrial prosperity; in times of war the administrative efficiency of the Phelps Dodge corporation in Bisbee is measurable in terms of life and death among our soldiers and the soldiers of our Allies at the front.

On June 27, 1917, the employees of the Copper Queen and of the neighboring properties, the Calumet and Arizona and the Shattuck, Arizona, went out on strike. On July 12, 1917, an armed mob under the nominal leadership of the county sheriff overwhelmed eleven hundred and eighty-six strikers and their alleged sympathizers, herded them aboard a train of cattle and box cars especially provided by the El Paso and Southwestern, a subsidiary of the copper companies, and under the muzzles of rifles, revolvers and machine guns deported them into the New Mexican desert. One man was killed while defending his home against illegal invasion. Others had their scalps and bones broken. Hundreds of homes were broken up. The ranking officer of the Phelps Dodge corporation in Bisbee had given out an interview in which he denounced the strikes in Bisbee and the other copper camps of Arizona as of pro-German origin and advocated deportations as the patriotic remedy.

After an interval of more than two months, President Wilson at the instance of Mr. Samuel Gompers appointed a commission headed by Secretary Wilson of the Federal Department of Labor to adjust the industrial disputes which continued seriously to restrict the output of the copper mines, and, incidentally, to make an investigation and report upon the Bisbee deportations and their effect upon our military preparations. The conclusions of the commission with respect to the industrial policy pursued by the managers of the great copper properties in Bisbee throw a flood of light upon the causes of the widespread industrial unrest that has held back our shipping, aeroplane and munitions program to the verge of a national scandal.

"The deportations of the 12th of July last from the Warren district of Arizona," begins the report, "as well as the practices that followed such deportations have deeply affected the opinions of laboring men as well as the general public throughout the country. They have been made the basis of an attempt to affect adversely public opinion among some of the people of the Allies. Their memory still embarrasses the establishment of industrial peace throughout the country, which it is indispensable to obtain and maintain if the war is to be brought to the quickest possible conclusion."

The commission found that while the miners had grievances, which they sincerely felt called for rectification by the companies, these grievances were not of a nature to justify a strike, provided some rational machinery had existed for the peaceful adjustment of disputes. But the companies created no such machinery, neither did the government attempt to supply it until months after the most pressing need for it had passed. The strikers formulated their grievances and invited the managers to a conference for their adjustment. The managers in Bisbee explain their refusal to confer on the ground that the strike had been called by the I. W. W. In their opinion, which was without foundation in the statutes of Arizona or the United States, the I. W. W. in and of itself and irrespective of proscribed conduct by individual members was an outlaw organization. But in the course of their investigations the commission found that representatives of the Phelps Dodge corporation had taken the same "no conference no compromise" attitude toward the miners' union affiliated with the A. F. of L. on strike in other copper camps owned by the corporation. Rather than deal with their employees through trade union officials they preferred to see their mines crippled until they could settle on their own terms.

The overt reason for the Bisbee deportations, the President's commission found, was "the belief in the minds of those who engineered them that violence was contemplated by the strikers, that life and property would be unsafe unless the deportations were undertaken," but the commission could discover no justification for this belief. An experienced officer of the United States army, sent to Bisbee at the request of the governor of Arizona, reported that "everything was peaceful and that troops were neither needed nor warranted under existing conditions." To the same effect was the testimony of "reputable citizens as well as of officials of city and county who were in a position to report accurately and without bias."

It was because the deportations were without justification, either in fact or in law that, as the commission reports, "those who planned and directed them," including "managers and other officials of the Phelps Dodge corporation Copper Queen division and of the Calumet and Arizona Mining Company, purposely abstained from consulting about their plans either with the United States attorney in Arizona or the law officers of the state or county or their own legal advisers."

This brutal resort to the spirit of mob violence

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has sent a blaze of industrial unrest and suspicion throughout our industrial army. The commission puts it mildly when they say that the memory of the Bisbee deportations "still embarrasses the establishment of industrial peace." Wage-workers suspected of harboring disloyal sentiments have been apprehended and thrown into jail. Managers who instigated and helped to execute plans "wholly illegal and without authority in law either state or federal" have been given commissions in the American army and invited into the innermost councils of the government. What is the result? We are months behind in the production of munitions, months behind in the production of ships, months behind in the production of aeroplanes. Agents of the government report that, since the Bisbee deportations, the strength of the I. W. W. in the timber camps of the Northwest has increased two and three hundred per cent. The spruce industry is completely paralyzed, and without spruce the construction of aeroplanes stops. "Talk to the lumber jacks," these agents say, "and they will answer you in terms of Bisbee." And our fleet of aeroplanes was relied upon by the Allies to blind the eyes of the Prussian army.

The President's commission "joins in the recommendation of Governor Campbell of Arizona that the responsible law officers of the state and county pursue appropriate remedies for the vindication of the laws, in so far as the deportations of July 12th and the events following the same constitute violations of the laws of Arizona." Governor Campbell laments his helplessness. He has instructed the attorney general of his state to act and the attorney general fails to act. The commission urges upon the President "the wisdom of recommending to the Congress that in so far as deportations such as we have set forth have not yet been made a federal offense such occurrences hereafter be made criminal under the federal law." These recommendations are excellent, as recommendations for the future, but they do not restore deportees to their homes, neither do they vindicate the constitutional rights of citizens which have been ignored by processes not provided by law. The wage-workers are not doctors of law. Their sole guide is common sense and it baffles their layman's reason to understand how it is possible to jail them on suspicion of holding illegal opinions, while both federal and state authorities are helpless to redress wrongs "wholly illegal" committed against them. It is unsound public policy to permit the impression to get abroad that the law is blind in one eye.

The report of the President's commission gives to the administration at Washington an opportunity to restore the confidence of the wage-workers in the majesty of the law and the determination of the government to render even-handed justice. "In order to carry the plans for the deportations into successful execution the leaders in the enterprise utilized the local office of the Bell Telephone Company and exercised or attempted to exercise a censorship over parts of the interstate connections of both the telephone and telegraph lines. Among those who were deported, and who were thereafter arrested in seeking entrance into the district, were several who were registered under the selective draft law and sought to return in order to discharge their legal duty of reporting for physical examination under the draft." Hundreds of wage-workers are being held in jail or under heavy bond on suspicion of conspiring to interfere with the draft. The facts reported by the commission are records of actual interference with the law that have glistened on the surface for months. They have been known to the United States attorney in Arizona. They should have been known in the office of the attorney general at Washington. If we urge that they be given not only appropriate but also prompt attention, it is because there is abundant evidence to show that prompt attention is essential to the restoration of that confidence among tens of thousands of wage-workers without which appeals to patriotism may fall upon doubting and distrustful ears.

Priority on Strike

IN the several articles published by The New Republic on the desirability of centralization of authority throughout the government departments, we have not as yet referred to one of the most astonishing and scandalous instances of thorough lack of such centralization. For at least a month before Mr. Garfield, the Fuel Administrator, requested Mr. Lovett to issue orders, as Director of Priority, giving our coal-mines the right to have a certain degree of preference in the distribution of railroad cars, it was admitted by all persons concerned that drastic measures were necessary if factories were not to close down and people were not to freeze in their own houses this winter. It was admitted that there was increasing danger of a frightful crisis. It was coming. But who was to run out and face it and stop it?

The coal-operators went to the Interstate Commerce Commission. The Interstate Commerce Commission found itself embarrassed. Its duty, far from being that of giving preference, has been to prevent preference, to prevent "discrimination." The coal-operators went to the Railways' War Board. The Railways' War Board, quite naturally, is composed of railway men. With rail-

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way men it has been a habit, and it has now become an instinct, that coal-mines should always wait for cars until other interests have been satisfied. With them it has always been factories first and coal-mines last. Besides, this new idea that coal-mines should be given a preference, was it not an idea in "priority?" Let the coal-operators go to Mr. Lovett. The coal-operators go to Mr. Lovett. Mr. Lovett admits that he deals with priority, but is not this request for priority for coal-mines a matter primarily of coal-administration? Let the coal-operators go to Mr. Garfield. The coal-operators go to Mr. Garfield. Mr. Garfield listens. He listens a long time. He seems to feel the need of consulting with the various government departments through which the coal-operators have traveled on their way to him. He consults. It is then felt that there must be a special organ for this consulting. Accordingly we see the creation of a new specimen of that locust-plague, the Inter-Departmental Committee, consisting, in this case, of liaison-officers, so to speak, from the Fuel Administration, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Railways' War Board and the Priority Board.

This Committee makes the kind of progress always made by diplomats who have to report back to their superior officers and get their sanction before they can say anything or do anything in any smallest detail bindingly. The only sort of Committee that is worth its salt in these supreme matters is an absolutely top-committee, of people at the heads of things, clothed with authority to say to Mr. Lovett or to Mr. Garfield or to somebody: "Do it. And do it now." The Inter-Departmental Committee on railway preference for coal-mines was a failure, for rapidity, before it started. And even while it was starting, and while it was consulting and conferring, its chances of acting in a timely manner, in a useful manner, were every day diminished by the activity of certain other additional government departments, not yet mentioned, which also deal with "priority."

On July twentieth of this year the American Railway Association, through its Special Committee on National Defense, issued Bulletin 22. In this bulletin it bindingly requested all railways to obey the priority orders issued by all "contract officers" of the Army Department and of the Navy Department. These orders are issued in those famous "blue envelopes." If the Army Department or the Navy Department buys something, and some "contract officer" thinks it important, out goes an order which results in a "blue envelope" which the manufacturer of the thing bought is careful to pin to his shipment of it; and off goes the shipment, in its freight-car, in thousands and thousands of freight-cars, each protected and expedited by a "blue envelope" issued by a "contract officer" of the War Department or of the Navy Department, irrespective of the Railways' War Board and irrespective, too, of Mr. Lovett himself, the Grand Priority Boss.

Remember: when one of these "blue envelopes" is flashed by a shipper on a local railway official, he must not merely expedite the shipment; he must at once expedite a car to the shipper's switch-track to get the shipment. And so we have a large percentage of all our traffic in certain heavy industrial districts moving on "blue envelopes" which do not represent any concerted plan whatsoever either by specialized railway people or by specialized priority people. And, instead of having less congestion through governmental "unified" control, we have more congestion, enormously more; and we have the Army Department and the Navy Department insisting on further and further congestion, with further and further expense and delay; and we have railway people actually going out with a wrecking train and a wrecking crew to a crammed switch-yard, full of "blue enevelope" cars, and spending time and money lifting certain really especially important government-shipment cars bodily, with wrecking-machinery, from one track to another in order to get them out of the ruck and on their way in obedience to what might be called an extra-special-ultra-blue-envelope order from a government official. When everything is blue and everything is priority, then we have to have an indigo blue and a See-here-I-mean-it-this-time priority. There can be no priority for anything until somebody has authority to decide what things are to have priority over all other things. At the present moment priority is doing about as much effective work as if it had downed tools and gone on strike.

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The Railroad Crisis

THE present railroad situation is characterized by profound uncertainty. The issues at stake are by no means clear and the possible alternative ways of meeting the problem have not been made explicit. The forces at work upon the surface could hardly appear more contradictory and confusing. Railroad managements are urging substantial increases in freight rates, while the shippers are using every device to delay consideration of this demand. The government is anxious to provide adequate transportation facilities for its troops as well as for all the goods needed to maintain civil and military life. Certain groups of railroad employees are increasingly restive under the high cost of living. And, to heighten the complexity, the demand for public assumption of the railroads becomes daily more insistent. In this situation the conclusions of honest students of the railroad problem are naturally at opposite poles. Yet certain new facts, salient to a candid inquiry, have recently come to hand, and an effort to keep them in view, as our nation in the next few months makes important decisions relative to rates, wages and transportation needs, will strengthen the chances of our following the wisest course.

At the outbreak of the war the railroads of the country were for operating purposes consolidated into one transcontinental system under the administration of a Railroads' War Board composed of prominent railroad executives. The economies in time and money which this unification was calculated to bring about have been largely realized and the railroads are justly proud of their achievements. The record of this work which is available through the bulletins of their own American Railways Association has an interest, however, which is derived no less from the sources of the economies than from their substantial contribution to the conduct of the war. The handling of the coal situation is an excellent case in point. At the shipping points on the Great Lakes and the Atlantic seaboard it has been the custom to hold the coal of the several grades and of different mine owners on the tracks until enough cars had been accumulated to fill a ship from the mines of one owner. By the pooling of all coal of the same grade upon its arrival at the point of shipment, tens of thousands of cars have been freed from one to two days sooner than was possible in the past; and by the creation of an Operators' Exchange a settlement is easily effected among the mine owners. In the shipments to Atlantic ports, the confusion was multiplied by the existence of over eleven hundred trade names used to distinguish coal which would otherwise be without distinguishing characteristics. By reduction of the number of allowed distinctions to forty-one, the equivalent of 133,000 freight cars is now saved; and an additional economy results in the elimination of endless shifting of cars at the tidewater terminals.

The so-called freight car shortage—more accurately referred to as the number of unfilled car orders—has in consequence of this and other economies, such as full loading, and rapid movement and interchange of cars among the roads, been drastically lowered. From May to September of this year the unfilled orders fell from 148,627 to 31,591. And although there were but three per cent more freight cars in use in June, 1917, than a year before, they were rendering twenty-six per cent more service; while locomotives were increasing their daily performance by six miles and the hauling of "empties" was being cut down five per cent.

But this is not all. Mr. Howard Elliott in one of the War Board bulletins italicizes and underscores his assertion:

> If by a little better loading by the shipper, a little better unloading by the shipper, a little better movement by the railroad, and a little more alert work by every man in the railways . . . each car was used a little better, it would not take long to get that 150,000 cars (the shortage on May 1, 1917) out of the 2,500,000 cars (the total number of freight cars).

The significance of this statement should not be missed. It is a virtual admission that the unfilled orders would disappear altogether with careful planning and administration. By itself this is a harmless admission, but it is at this point that the facts of war economies begin to relate themselves to a second fact of the present railroad crisis—the need of new facilities. For in a previous paragraph of the same bulletin Mr. Elliott has these words:

> Those of us who have been in the railroad business a long time have preached for years that the country for its own interests ought to permit the railroads to spend at least a billion dollars a year in new additions to our plant.

But no small part of the argument for new capital outlay has always been the need of more freight cars. If, with roads operating as one system, economies can be effected which minimize the shortage of freight cars, it is only natural that a question should arise as to the possible extent of substantial economies in other directions as well.

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Let there be no misunderstanding. The railroads need new equipment at once—and need it badly. But the recently achieved economies will create widespread hesitation as to the amount of new resources which are actually necessary. And they will create reluctance to provide capital for roads to use for their individual needs as competing, profit-making units rather than for their needs as parts of one organically conceived national system. In the light of their war efficiency, the demands of the railroads for new capital must be subject to exceptional scrutiny. And it is in trying at the same time to make permanent the economies resulting from the present consolidation, to protect the public from a gigantic private monopoly and to make it possible for sufficient railroad equipment to be procured, that we are confronted by several seriously advanced proposals for the solution of the railroad problem. From among them we are bound to choose a policy either as soon as peace is declared and the question of the status of the railroads in relation to our anti-trust laws has to be settled, or in the nearer future in connection with demands for rate increases and higher wages. There are at hand four quite distinct alternatives.

First, we can restore pre-war competition and allow the railroads to operate as upwards of six hundred separate corporations. We can allow rate increases sufficient to create earnings which will strengthen the security market and make it possible to float new issues on a basis of these individual, competitive needs. This will be the most expensive procedure from every point of view.

Second, we can retain the economies of operating as a national unit; change our trust laws; create five or six huge sectional systems under federal incorporation; and give the Interstate Commerce Commission complete power over the issuance of securities and over rates. We can then guarantee governmentally a certain per cent return on a basis of past earnings and put a representative of the government with veto power upon each system's directorate. This suggestion emanates from a prominent railroad president. Should this plan be followed, the question of rate increase could be held in abeyance for the present, and the issue of new securities would be carried on under proper safeguards.

The third alternative differs from the second in that instead of having the government guarantee earnings it provides that the government finance all new outlays by its own bond issues. It would then preferably own and rent the new equipment to the railroads. This suggestion has merits from several points of view. It combines the advantages of private operation with the economy of securing funds on government credit. And it places the government in a position of the closest possible working alliance and progressive control over renewals and extensions. It means also that no additional increments of private capital with its overt influences and its yearnings for profit are being added to the fixed charges of these public carriers. Moreover, the government would find itself in possession of more and more equipment, the cost of which was known, and on a basis of which payment for the whole could, when government ownership was broached, proceed with better satisfaction to all parties. Judged with an eye to its effect on the national income this plan has much to commend it, not only to those interested in saving money for the country, but to those who believe that public operation, although eventually desirable, should be preceded by a period of more rigorous education of public opinion.

The immediate adoption of government ownership and operation is the fourth alternative. It has the advantage of being simple to advocate, of being exceedingly popular, and of appearing to solve difficult questions. Yet a moment's thought upon the problems that it raises leads to the admission that nationalization creates almost as many problems as it solves. And, undertaken at this time with the war and post-war problems upon it, there is grave danger that this added enterprise would fail to receive the competent, undivided consideration it requires.

But the war may have brought a new zeal and new sense of the meaning of public service which would surmount all difficulties if we were to enter upon this most radical of the alternatives. It may be that we underestimate the intensity and the constancy of the high-minded and energetic devotion which could be summoned to this task. Speculation in these directions is, however, of little avail. The important consideration is that we deliberately frame for ourselves the implications of these alternatives and rescue the situation from the forces of drift. The specific course which the country then takes will be of less importance than the fact that it has been entered upon intentionally, affirmatively and with some conscious estimate of the risks incurred.

ORDWAY TEAD.

Politics in South Africa

THE native problem dominates the South African scene. Whatever political issues and movements show in the foreground, it supplies the permanent background. However much the white population of South Africa may be absorbed in the racial and economic rivalries of the immediate present, it cannot but be profoundly

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apprenensive about its future, so long as the native problem remains unsolved. This is, of course, no new insight. In the days when the Union was in the making, and memories of recent war between Briton and Boer were even bitterer than they are now, thoughtful men perceived the urgency of the problem, recognized in it both a danger and an opportunity. Some courageously hoped that it would act as the much needed nation-making factor, drawing English and Dutch together through the sense of a common peril and a common task. Others, like Jan Hofmeyr, the leader of the "Bond," feared rather that the task of controlling a native population, outnumbering the whites by nearly 5 to 1, would prove too heavy a strain in men and money, and that the Union, compelled to rely, as heretofore, on British garrisons, would enjoy self-government only in name. Neither the hopes of the former nor the fears of the latter have been realized. The creation of a Union Defense Force has permitted the withdrawal of British troops, but the two white races have not been drawn more closely together, and no proposal for the solution of the problem has so far proved acceptable. In one respect, indeed, the war has but made the urgency of a solution more patent. The excellence of the native troops employed by the Germans in East Africa has opened the eyes of all South Africa to the menace to white civilization, if ever the black races through military training should learn to appreciate their military power. Hence, South Africa is sure to insist at the peace conference on an international convention by which the arming and training of natives will be forbidden, as they have been and are forbidden in South Africa.

Meanwhile, the problem remains, and it is worth while to appreciate its fundamental factors. Though in name a democracy, South Africa is in fact a small white aristocracy superposed on a large native substratum. It is an aristocracy both politically and economically. With few exceptions, the natives do not enjoy and cannot acquire those active political rights of which the franchise is the symbol. It is not a question, mainly, of the natives' present unfitness for the vote, which everyone must readily grant. It is a question of future political development. No policy which would ultimately involve that the white should admit the mass of the blacks to political power has any chance of acceptance, in the face of the unalterable numerical superiority of the blacks. Moreover, the white man considers himself degraded by doing the same sort of manual labor as the kaffir. The part for which he casts himself is that of master, boss, overseer. The natives' part is that of hewers of wood and drawers of water. They are to serve as a vast reservoir of unskilled labor for farm and mine. This economic motive profoundly influences all native policy, and often interferes with its equity. At the same time, work in towns, on farms, in mines, is steadily breaking down the traditional tribal organization of the natives; and their increasing education and industrial efficiency give them the right to demand more consideration. The experiment first made in the Glen Grey district of the Cape Colony, and subsequently extended to the Transkei, of substituting individual for communal tenure of land is, under proper safeguards, working well. The simultaneous experiment of giving the natives local self-government, on the other hand, has shown that the natives at present are not politically mature enough for executive and administrative functions. The best compromise has been to keep these functions in the hands of white magistrates, and make the native councils purely deliberative. But this, of course, is only a stage preparing the native, so it is hoped, for completer control over his own affairs.

Thus matters stood when the Union of South Africa was founded. In what direction have the thoughts of its statesmen been moving since then? To that question a speech which General Smuts delivered in London, in May of this year, furnishes an answer. He rightly characterizes the problem as one of maintaining "white racial unity in the midst of the black environment." This depends, in part, on avoiding two mistakes, viz., mere exploitation of the natives, and racial intermixture. The white races, Smuts insists, must strictly observe the *racial* axiom, "No intermixture of blood between the two colors," and the *moral* axiom, "Honesty, fair-play, justice, and the ordinary Christian virtues must be the basis of all our relations with the natives."

Both these axioms of General Smuts', clearly, aim even more at the protection of the black race against the white, than of the white race against the black. The chief source of racial impurity is not the "black peril," but the "white peril," which the white press never mentions. It is the white man, not the black, who is responsible for the existence of over 600,000 "colored" people in South Africa at the present day. Again, whilst native labor is absolutely necessary for the economic development of South Africa, it cannot be said that under present conditions (e. g., herding in mine-compounds apart from family and tribe) the best interests of the natives are safeguarded, as according to Smuts's moral axiom they ought to be. Moreover, the "backveld" Dutchman regards the land of South Africa as belonging to him and his people by a sort of divine right, and where he has his way (as in the Orange Free

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State) no native is allowed to own land. It is to the interest of farmers and mine-owners alike to keep the bulk of the natives permanently at the level of a reservoir of unskilled labor. Such an atmosphere is obviously not favorable to a liberal native policy.

But the problem is not only racial, economic, and moral, it is also political. Any incorporation of the blacks in the structure of white society is bound to raise, in the long run, the problem of admitting them to citizenship, giving them the vote, and treating them as the white man's political equals. There is only one way of avoiding this result, and that way is segregation of the native —the creation of parallel institutions, the parcelling out of the land in a chequered pattern of white and black areas. This is the policy to which General Smuts pins his hopes. It is an application of the Glen Grey experiment on a large scale. It recognizes the fact that "It is useless to try to govern black and white in the same system. . . . They are different not only in color but in minds and in political capacity, and their political institutions should be different, while always proceeding on the basis of self-government." It may be hailed as an admission that the native has rights of his own, above all the right to work out his own destiny and devise his own way of learning from, and adjusting himself to, the white man's civilization, contact with which he can no longer escape.

The idea is, wherever there are large bodies of natives, to assign to them definite areas within which no white man may own land. The native, on his side, is to be forbidden to own land in white areas, though he is to be free to go and work for the white man. The races having been thus territorially separated, each is to live under its own political institutions, those of the natives taking, to begin with, the form of self-governing village communities.

That the scheme is promising in principle, there can be little doubt. At least it is safe to say, that if this does not succeed, nothing else will. But the details of its working out will, none the less, be full of difficulty and require the highest qualities of constructive statesmanship, if there is to be justice to both races. A beginning has so far been made by The Natives' Land act of 1913, a purely temporary measure designed chiefly to prevent speculation in land in anticipation of later legislation. By this act, the existing native reserves have been scheduled and Europeans have been forbidden to acquire land inside, and the natives to acquire land outside. It is, however, illustrative of the extreme difficulty of the situation, that the application of the act to the Cape Colony had to be declared illegal by the Court of Appeal, as contrary to the constitution of the Union. For the Cape Colony, on entering the Union, had retained and safeguarded its native franchise, based on a property qualification. Hence the Court held that no native could be deprived of the right of purchasing the land necessary for enrollment as a voter. How this difficulty is to be overcome by future legislation does not at present appear, but a solution will probably be found.

Meanwhile, the existing native reserves are insufficient for the natural expansion of the population actually on the soil, though an improvement in the present primitive methods of agriculture would solve this difficulty for some time to come. But in any case large bodies of natives, at present living in urban centers and on white men's farms, have to be provided for. Hence the existing native areas have to be extended and considerable new areas have to be added. Several commissions have successively been appointed to deal with this problem, but their recommendations have not met with a favorable reception. The natives naturally want their areas to be large enough for future expansion, of suitable location and climate for their mode of life, and of sufficiently good quality for agriculture and stock-breeding to give them a chance of economic independence.

But as one would expect, on the other hand, the white farmers now holding land in proposed new native areas naturally object to giving up good land and seeking a new home elsewhere, even though the government does not propose expropriation but voluntary sale. But more formidable opposition will certainly come from a coalition of all those who need native labor. They will fight to the uttermost any proposal to make the native areas so large and so fertile that the economic pressure is reduced which now drives large numbers of natives into the white man's labor market. That native fears on this point are not wholly unfounded, is shown by the report of one commission which allocated a little over twelve per cent of the Union territory to its 5,000,000 black inhabitants (the new areas being mostly in the malarial region of northern Transvaal), and rather more than eighty-seven per cent to its 1,250,000 whites, of whom more than two-fifths reside in towns. The chairman of that commission, a retired Natal judge, was the only one who dissented from these recommendations.

Lastly, as if these difficulties were not sufficiently formidable in themselves, they are increased by the racial antagonism of Briton and Boer which plays into almost every political question. A large section of the Dutch population is undisguisedly hostile to South Africa's participation in the war,

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and, therefore, to the recruiting of natives for labor-battalions in France. Even members of the legislative assembly do not disdain to play on the racial prejudices of the backveld Boer by arguments such as these: "The government, without consulting the people, sent 10,000 natives to Flanders. There they wear khaki and walk about the streets. What is the result? The native considers himself the equal of the European." Meanwhile, the war acts as a serious drain on the numbers of the small white population. Nothing but extensive immigration after the war will enable it to keep pace with the expansion of the native population and to make good its claim to large areas of land by effective occupation and use. But there is nothing that most Boers desire less than immigration, especially British immigration, for they know well enough that, sooner or later, they will be outnumbered and outvoted and their present political control lost forever. Yet it is equally clear that an illiberal policy alike towards the natives and towards white immigrants is bound to make the position of the white race in South Africa more precarious with every year that passes. At present, the eye that would pierce the future, sees the deepening shadow of the native problem creep slowly but surely over the sunny spaces of South Africa. R. F. A. H.

(Another article on the problems of South Africa will follow in the near future.)

A Rookie's Reaction

So a psychological commission is now engaged in measuring our mental aptitude and adaptability for various types of service in the national army. Who can guess what incredible revelations may be brought about by these vocational experts? We who have been paper-hangers it may be are better fitted by far for the signal corps, and we former professors of Greek perhaps have that unique intellectual equipment which makes one well nigh invaluable as a camp cook. All honor to this attempt at efficiency and fairness in military organization. Yet many of us have already been analyzing the reaction of our own minds to this extraordinary condition of living in our camp, and, being chiefly New England men, we are naturally and traditionally experts in introspection. So it may well appear that we strike unusual depth in our reflections. As for myself, I cannot say with certainty yet what branch of the service I am peculiarly fitted for, but I have a sneaking suspicion that it is for the Red Cross rather than the heavy field artillery.

The prevailing attitude among the men on the roll of honor of our new army I am very sure is stoicism, verging on fatalism. This war is a sorry business; it's no joke, being torn away from a home long enjoyed, or, infinitely worse, one just started; giving up a career in business lately assured after long uncertainty; leaving as memories only an æsthetic argosy, gay and poignant voyages in color and sound sensation, with a hundred luring seas right at hand. These are things not lightly relinquished for the simple relief of compulsion in even a worthy single cause. So one must candidly say that the characteristic spirit of the camp is not one of spontaneous enthusiasm or gay abandon. Yes, it is a sorry business; but it must apparently be done, so of course it is to be done. Whatever is due to come will be borne doubtless in the same patient way. Mr. Bourne calls this acquiescence. So it is, but there is no shame in that, to be sure; the attitude can be criticized only on grounds of inflexibility and lack of humor, never for any lack of high and worthy seriousness. The troubles are being packed away honestly and courageously in the old kit bag, however wan the smile may be. What light-heartedness appears is of that pathetic or brutal sort which justifies calling the men philosophers in the definition implied by the gentle-minded lady who said: "Be philosophical, my dear; resolve just not to think about it."

Uncertainty breeds humor, however, and the drabness is touched up with gayer flashes. "Where do we go from here, boys?" is a very significant song; it can be sung with real feeling when men make up their packs on a few hours' notice, hastily telegraph home and are entrained for parts darkly guessed at. ——— means, we surmise, that you will be taken right to the river bank and dropped on transports with steam up; but it may be Camp ———, which means France sooner or later, but a little later; or it may be simply the prospect of a strange, drawling winter in Georgia. This is a great uncertainty, that keeps a spark of nervous humor thrilling in even the most calloused sensibility.

Many are the minor uncertainties. One is when the leggings will arrive, so you can meet your best girl with killing effect next Sunday. Speaking of next Sunday, the query arises whether an unkind providence in the person of the first sergeant will put you on kitchen police duty for that date, thus ruining the one welcomed day in seven. Being on kitchen police is no joke, in spite of O'Hara. O'Hara, it seems, was naughty, and so received as punishment kitchen police duty for a week. He wrote home of his appointment to this office of trust and responsibility, and was credited in the

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local paper with a promotion to the police force of Camp Devens. At first we were kept amused by the possibility of more glass-eyed and active-tuberculosis draftees staying a week longer; they were sent up by patriotic local boards who wanted to have a record quota; that they succeeded in this laudable ambition is being earnestly claimed by the physicians in camp. I must confess myself to a mild and innocent curiosity as to how much hash I will get when I am the 149th in the cafeteria line of 150, or how clean the dishwater in the two little pans will be under similar circumstances.

Yes, a few draftees are rejected, and sent back, strange to say, to normal life; they are the pieces of the game that seem, somehow, back in the closet laid. An apt simile, this; a veritable checkerboard of nights and days. That some one knows about it all we do not doubt, for orders come, men go. But as we are hither and thither moved, we outgrow a bit the sodden pessimism of Omar, and the expectancy of the unexpected, the hope of the improbable, give us gentle anticipations of the morrow.

I suppose before long great-hearted and resolute-willed—and very simple-minded—men will go lecturing around the country about this military life bringing us (as it has brought other soldiers) bang-up against the great fundamentals of life, the eternal verities, the main, central simple objectives. This is earnest and well meant rhetoric; one might wish it were true; but I hope it will be sharply challenged by our minds before we draw our conclusions.

I cannot speak for the fighting soldiers, to be sure. They say they are having soul-cleansing and rich, glowing experiences. Such war doubtless offers to some boys. I remember reading a college lad's letter. He described himself as lounging under a munitions truck, reading Snappy Stories, while shrapnel and shells were playfully bursting about him. He took time to scribble this note, in which he said: "I'm thankful for what this war is doing for me. It has grown hair on my chest, taught me to obey disagreeable orders graciously, and wiped away the damn superficial attitude of college." I am reminded of the statements of officers, to the effect that at last they had sloughed off the conventionalities, the veneer; their lives had become for the first time unified, clarified, coherent. Both of these naïve and sincere expressions seem to me to show obviously that these men had so pitifully little to slough off. The environment of peace, the opportunities of college, for instance, were a thousand fold richer in chances for greatness of spirit; and it is a startling commentary on the lad's sensitiveness of response to see how unawakened it was to fine and subtle and complex appeals. Is it true, then, that war makes one richly developed because war induces certain sincere reactions? Not if the reactions are essentially commonplace, obvious, unrefined. Oh, how I am disgusted with those popular preachers of morality who talk about the veneer of civilization, as if culture were a block of dead wood! Rather it is a living tree, dependent for growth, vigor and beauty upon the continued exploration and complexity of its roots and leaves. The latest word in literature, music, science and philosophy is not a superficiality; it is the richness, complexity, joy of life, that alone make living tolerable. To assert that the sloughing off of these or the opportunity for them, the descent to plain food, plain dirt, plain blood, means a shedding of superficiality, is to say that the amœba's existence is the only vital and fundamental thing in experience.

So I must imagine to be the case among the fighting men. No one will deny that the energies of many are now for the first time really aroused. But there are three obvious interpretations of this fact. Some of these fellows, even our officers, are merely very young, and they have hitherto been too immature to respond to any great spiritual stimuli. Restless before a confusing environment which they were unable to analyze, or else blasé in an early conformity to conventional modes of reaction, no wonder they have grasped eagerly at the sound reality of this simple experience. And there are many of them (let us say to ourselves with shame) who have never had the chance to respond; men whose natures have been numbed by a mechanical and visionless routine of shop, office or college. And fewest of all, I suspect, are those singularly blunt and stupid spirits that are incapable of realizing the gracious and genuinely satisfying experiences of life. We may be glad that all these men have now finally become thrilled; but they had best not believe, in the first full flush of an idea, that they must issue dicta on the value of all human experience! No, to submit to this war business means a sacrifice, temporary at least, and for some of us final, of the finest things that all evolution has produced; and the sacrifice is a hideous one, sickening, terrible. It is lightened only by the faith that it is a temporary one and necessary; made excusable only by the hope of thus safeguarding and creating a greater opportunity for precisely such cultural development in the future. But let it never be glorified for its own sake, on the ground that it has displaced a lesser order. In spite of the fine stoicism, the cool and ardent courage, the patient and reckless faith it has produced, it is essentially a stimulus of a lower, less imaginative, less vital sort than the less unified but more pregnant appeals of a peace culture.

Whether this is true or not in the front line

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trenches, it is surely so here in camp. "Routine," a man said, "is my middle name, and I want to forget the day I was christened." Marching, digging, shooting, paring potatoes, washing your cast-iron fork in democratized dish-water, adopting the new standard of truth based on military rank, doing disagreeable jobs graciously, growing hair on the chest—these are all routine, brutish, unimaginative jobs, and to be treated as such, endured only because they are sadly necessary.

There are compensations. Looking at the mushroom town of thirty thousand by night, blazing barracks, row on row; sitting in a crowded (and greatly appreciated) "Y. M. Hut," where a first-rate violinist is playing a program of rag and Fritz Kreisler, artistically blended; noticing a college instructor and a drummer jogging elbows while they read magazines around the fireplace or write home; shoving my way among a mob of five thousand gathered to hear Oh, Boy; talking spiritedly about free love and the end of the war with the teamster bunking next me on my right, considering all this, I am persuaded that this affair means clear gain for democracy. Men are learning to work and feel together, chiefly in a clean and vigorous fashion; many are having the chance to hear good speakers, see good movies, hear good music, play good games, read good books, for the first time in their lives; and the chance is almost a compulsion, for time must be killed. My heart was singularly responsive to a clumsy farmer lad who happened across an Odyssey, in the original, in one of the Y. M. C. A. libraries, and, remembering academy days, burrowed into it with set jaw for an hour, trying to catch the spell of its "surge and thunder." Oh, yes, in spite of the popularity of sickening sentimentality in songs (I have even heard The Baggage Coach Ahead sung and listened to seriously) and the continuous and vacuous profanity, one feels that the future for democracy is considerably brighter because of the community of thought, feeling and action that these training camps are making to be. Who shall say, even among us stoical, routine-driven impotent pieces of the game, that were the war to end tomorrow, this camp life could not to advantage be continued for a year, especially if constructive, cultural elements were to take the place of much of the military routine? The war end tomorrow? In more ways than one it might actually work democracy harm.

WALTER R. AGARD.

The Re-Organization of the British Labor Party

AMERICANS know full well how important, in the working of a constitution, are the organized political parties out of which the legislature is composed. The advent, in European and Australian politics, of an organized Labor or Social party, has been an event of far-reaching social effect. In Great Britain, the Labor party, though numerically much smaller than the Liberal or Radical, and the Conservative or Unionist parties, has already attained a position of almost co-equal political influence with either of them. An immense franchise reform, doubling the aggregate electorate, raising the total to more than a third of the census population, introducing to the vote some six million women, and effecting a drastic redistribution of seats in close proportion to population will, it is expected, become law in the near future. Both the Liberal and the Unionist parties are quietly preparing to reorganize their electoral forces. The Labor party has publicly formulated a scheme for its own reorganization, which will be adopted at the party conference in January, 1918. This proposal may well prove to be a turning point in British political history. Instead of a sectional and somewhat narrow group, what is aimed at is now a national party, open to anyone of the sixteen million electors agreeing with the party program.

The momentous nature of the proposal is emphasized by its coincidence, first with an evident determination on the part of the Trades Union Congress, which represents the four and a half million Trade Unionists on the industrial side, to join more closely than heretofore with the Labor party in promoting Parliamentary action; and secondly with the quite new determination of the Coöperative Wholesale Society and the Coöperative Union, representing the three and a half million members of industrial Coöperative Societies to swing the whole strength of their great movement into direct political action in close alliance with the Labor party. These three national organizations of the British wage-earners enrol, as members, very largely the same householders or families. But eliminating all duplication of membership, it is estimated that they include, among the three of them, at least two-fifths of the entire population of the United Kingdom. So great an aggregation of working class organizations has never before come shoulder to shoulder in any country.

The British Labor party, formally established in 1900, has hitherto been, essentially, a federation of trade unions (mainly the larger ones, with over two million membership); three relatively small Socialist societies (with less than fifty thousand membership); trades councils and local labor parties in some dozens of towns; and a few other organizations, such as coöperative societies and the Women's Labor League. Its first big success was achieved at the general election of 1906, when fifty Labor candidates went to the poll, and twenty-nine were elected to Parliament, where they at once formed a separate party, with its own officers and whips. At the last general election, in December, 1910, forty-two candidates of the party were success-

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ful. The "Labor Members" have been, to the extent of about four-fifths, the secretaries or other salaried officials of trade unions, whilst the remainder have been members of Socialist societies belonging, as they are proud to claim, to the "intellectual proletariat," The great majority of the Labor Members in Great Britain like those of Australia are, however, definitely and avowedly Socialist in their opinions, and the program of the party, as declared at successive party conferences, has become one of distinctively Socialist character. This is, of course, only parallel with a corresponding evolution in the Trades Union Congress.

What is now proposed is a party organized on the double basis of national societies and constituency organizations. The trade unions and Socialist societies will remain as they are, with their rights of representation and of voting power in exact proportion to numerical membership. The capitation fees on their vast memberships, which these trade unions pay to the Labor party, constitute an indispensable financial backing. But side by side with their delegates in the party conference will henceforth sit the delegates of the various electoral constituencies in which the party has a local organization. This is not a complete novelty, as trades councils and local Labor parties have always been admitted to affiliation, but their numbers have so far been small and their influence has not been considerable. It is now proposed to get local Labor parties organized in as many British constituencies as possible. The formation of three or four hundred, covering more than half the area and population, and more than half the constituencies of the nation, is looked for.

A more important proposal is the introduction, alongside the constituent bodies, of individually enrolled members. This, too, is not entirely a novelty. Energetic local Labor parties, like those at Barrow and Woolwich, have always admitted individual members, but usually only as associate members, sometimes only on ward committees. In view of the prospective doubling of the electorate, and especially of the admission of six million women, five-sixths of them married, it becomes plain that a much more direct appeal to the electors as such is indispensable for electoral success. The great majority of married women are not eligible for membership of any trade union. It is, too, unreasonable practically to exclude from the party all the men who do not enter through the narrow gate of trade unionism or that of membership of a definitely Socialist propagandist body. Hence provision is to be made, in every constituency, for a separate section of individually enrolled men, and another of individually enrolled women, who subscribe to the party constitution and program, and contribute a minimum of a quarter of a dollar a year, for men, and twelve and a half cents a year, for women. These sections of individual members will have representatives on the local Executive Committee, at the party conference, and even on the National Executive. It is hoped to enroll in this way, and to enlist in the service of the party, not only many hundreds of thousands of the new working-class electors, but also to attract many men and women of the shopkeeping, manufacturing, and professional classes who are dissatisfied with the old political parties.

A third feature is the special appeal to the six million women electors. The British Labor party has, indeed, always been open to women on the same terms as to men, on a basis of complete equality. It is a blunder to suppose that the Labor party has hitherto included no women, except the members of the Women's Labor League and the relatively few women members of the three Socialist societies. The party has always comprised quite as large a proportion of the women trade unionists as of the men. The very extensive Workers' Union, with over 200,000 members, includes a very high proportion of women. The Northern Counties Weavers' Amalgamation finds two-thirds of its 200,000 membership among women; and the Amalgamated Association of Card and Blowing Room Operatives and Ringspinners reckons only one-tenth of its membership of 56,000 to be men. Out of the two and a half million affiliated members of the British Labor party it is probable that something like a quarter of a million are women, being certainly more than half of all the organized women wage earners.

It is true that, owing to the legal formalities necessary before political action can be taken by a trade union, the National Federation of Women Workers, the largest exclusively female trade union, is only now becoming affiliated to the party; whilst several of the smaller women's unions still remain outside, just as do many of the smaller men's unions. It is, however, absurd to cite in this connection the National Union of Women Workers, with its affiliated membership of two and a half millions, as this strangely named organization is a federation of philanthropic and religious bodies, not of women wage-earners at all, but predominantly of middle and upper class workers among women. The British Labor party has, however, so far not laid itself out to make much use of women, and has never had any woman on its National Executive. Henceforth strenuous efforts will be made to enroll individual women as members of the local Labor parties; they will have their separate sections, and be secured representation on the local executives: and—unlike anything done by either the Liberal or the Unionist party organizations—provision is made for there being always at least four women members of the National Executive itself.

More important, however, than any of these changes in the constitution is the change of spirit that has inspired them. The British Labor party, which has never been formally restricted to manual-working wage-earners, is now to be publicly thrown open to all workers "by hand or by brain." Its declared object is to be, not merely the improvement of the conditions of the wage-earner, but "to secure for the producers, by hand or by brain, the full fruits of their industry, and the most equitable distribution thereof that may be possible, upon the basis of the common ownership of the means of production, and the best obtainable system of popular administration and control of each industry or service." The only persons to be excluded (and that, of course, only by inference) are the unoccupied and unproductive recipients of rents and dividends—the so-called "idle rich"—whom it is interesting to find The Times editorially declaring to be of no use to the community!

The British Labor party of the future, in short, is to be a party of the producers of wealth whether manual workers or brain workers (including, naturally, the workers engaged in transport and distribution), associated against the private owners of land and capital as such. Its policy of "common ownership" brings it, as a similar evolution brought John Stuart Mill—to use his own words in the Autobiography—"decidedly under the general designation of Socialist." But it is a Socialism which is no more specific than a definite repudiation of the individualism that characterized all the political parties of the past generation and that still dominates the House of Commons. This declaration of the British Labor party leaves it open to choose from time to time whatever forms of common

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ownership, from the coöperative store to the nationalized railroad, and whatever forms of popular administration and control of industry, from national guilds to ministries of employment and municipal management, may, in particular cases, commend themselves.

What the British Labor party at present means by its Socialism is revealed in the remarkable pamphlet which it has published on its After the War Program, setting forth in a dozen detailed and very lengthened resolutions passed at the Manchester party conference exactly what it wishes done with the railways, the canals, the coal mines, the banking system, the demobilization of the army and munition workers, the necessary rehousing of the people, the measures to be taken for preventing the occurrence of unemployment, the improvement of agriculture, the taxation to be imposed to pay for the war, the reform of our educational system, and what not. Opinions will naturally differ as to some of these sweeping proposals, but no one of any education can safely denounce them as unpracticable or despise them as ill-informed. It is, indeed, one of the claims of the Labor party that science is on their side; that it is their proposals, not those of the Liberals or those of the Unionists, that nowadays receive the general support of the "orthodox" economists; and that, as a matter of fact, it is essentially their proposals to which every minister of state, when he is brought up against a difficult problem of administration, has actually to turn—and then usually to lose his nerve, emasculate what would have got over his difficulties, and produce an abortion which has the advantages neither of individualism nor of collectivism!

But the program of the British Labor party is, and will probably remain, less important (except for educating the political leaders of other parties) than the spirit underlying the program, that spirit which gives any party its soul. The British Labor party stands essentially for revolt against the inequality of circumstance that degrades and brutalizes and disgraces our civilization. It abhors and repudiates the unscientific and immoral doctrine that the competitive struggle for the means of life is, in human society, either inevitable or requisite for the survival of the fittest: it declares indeed, in full accord with science, that competition produces degradation and death, whilst it is conscious and deliberate coöperation which is productive of life and progress. It is unreservedly democratic in its conviction—here also fortified by political science—that only by the widest possible participation in power and the most generally spread consciousness of consent can any civilized community attain either its fullest life or its utmost efficiency. But it recognizes that no mere rightness of aspiration or morality of purpose can in themselves accomplish their ends; and that for the achievement of results knowledge and the application of the scientific method are required, notably in the science of society, for the further study and endowment of which it presses.

And, finally, the British Labor party has faith in internationalism (as distinguished from the characteristically Liberal cosmopolitanism). It repudiates all "Imperialism" or desire for domination over other races. It pleads for the right of each people to live its own life, and make its own specific contribution to the world in its own way, recognizing indeed, no one "superior race," but "reciprocal superiorities" among all races. It is not without significance that the National Executive of the British Labor party has included, as a fundamental object of the party, the establishment of a Federation or League of Nations for the settlement of disputes between nations and for such international legislation as may prove possible. No other political party has yet nailed this flag to its mast.

The question has been raised in some quarters of changing the name of the party. Probably the National Executive has done wisely in making no such proposal. The British Labor party has been built up by a couple of decades of dogged work. It has gained a considerable and, on the whole, a very honorable reputation in the country. Over and over again its leaders and spokesmen, in the House of Commons and elsewhere, have been proved by subsequent events to have been right, when the trained statesmen of the Liberal and Conservative parties have been wrong. Who in England doubt to-day that the Labor party was right, and that Mr. Gladstone and his followers were mistaken, in the long controversy that delayed for a whole generation the graduation and differentiation of the income tax? Who in England is not ashamed to-day of the disaffected weak whiggery that has, down to this very hour, crippled our national policy in education, in public health, in housing? Above all, in forcing upon the country in the first years of the present century, in the teeth of practically all our statesmen except Mr. Arthur Acland and the late Sir Charles Dilke, the conception of a legally enforced minimum wage, and, generally, of the "common rule" in industrial relations, as opposed to the employer's autocracy in "individual bargaining," the British Labor party has transformed the very basis of the social order in a way that still baffles and bewilders the average Liberal or Conservative capitalist M. P.

At no period in its history has the party been restricted, either in theory or practice, to the manual working wage-earners. At no time has it given any excuse for the ignorant accusation that it regarded the manual workers alone as the creators of wealth. The retention of the present title rightly emphasizes the essential community of economic interest of all those who are, by their efforts, genuinely coöperating in the service of the community, as against those whose private ownership of land and capital permits them, without service, to levy a toll upon the producers.

The peculiarity of the British Labor party, in contrast with any other political party that has been or is likely to be formed, is that it starts with an organized force of four and a half million adult men and women, mostly heads of households, now to be almost entirely included in the electorate, who are enrolled and brigaded in trade unions, themselves for the most part formally affiliated to the party. This foundation in the trade union movement, whilst a source of obvious danger to the British Labor party in the way of limitation and narrowness, is, on the other hand, a valuable safeguard. We must not overstate the position. The members of a trade union, like the members of a co-operative society, are not all of one and the same political opinion. They do not elect their executive committees to express their political desires. Nevertheless, on a wide range of issues—it may be issues destined to figure more largely than heretofore in British election contests—trade unionists are remarkably united in political outlook, just as landowners or "Wall Street men" are; and on these issues it is rare indeed for any individual objection to be made to the political action taken by their representatives in their names. The trade unions act, so to speak, as caucuses inside the Labor party; bringing their memberships under its political influence, focusing for its information their special desires and aspirations, and securing, for its candidates, an invaluable and ready-made nucleus of supporters in every industrial constituency. The affiliated Socialist societies, with their much smaller memberships of

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active propagandists drawn from all social classes, contribute a no less valuable contingent of thinkers and writers, speakers and canvassers.

But the special advantage to the British Labor party of its trade union foundation, the advantage destined to give it a security for continued straightness of aim which other political parties might envy, is the firmness of its anchorage in social "equalitarianism." All political parties are subject in their choice of policy, and in their decision upon particular issues, to the bias given by the social environment of their predominant membership. So long as the British Labor party is anchored in the trade union movement, which now reaches down to the humblest unskilled laborer and sweated woman worker, we may rely confidently on its dominant bias being always for the mitigation of that inequality of circumstance which at present brutalizes our population and disgraces our civilization. And in this continual insistence on a better—that is, a more equal—distribution of the nation's annual produce (necessarily involving an actual reduction of the part taken by the hundred thousand or so families drawing $5,000 a year and upwards, in order that the nine million families drawing less than this income may get more), the British Labor party, as the landlords and capitalists are only now beginning to realize, has the support of political economy.

It is, of course, not suggested that the British Labor party is any more certain to be right in its social and industrial proposals than the Conservative party or the Liberal party, past or future. But it will be protected against one particular cause of error and of deviation from its course. Its bias, being always towards equalitarianism, will lead it, on the whole, towards the right course, not the wrong. The late Henry Broadhurst, one of the first Labor members of Parliament, was not an abler financier than the late Lord Rothschild, and was far less correctly informed about the wealth of the nation. Yet Broadhurst rightly demanded a system of old age pensions which Rothschild seriously and solemnly declared—no doubt with absolute sincerity—that the country could not possibly afford! Indeed, if one did not remember how inevitably the wealthy statesmen of wealthy political parties are biased by their circumstances, it would be hard to refrain from anger at the thought of how the Gladstones and Harcourts, the Goschens and St. Aldwyns, as Chancellors of the Exchequer, were accustomed literally to befool the nation—to tell it that it could not afford to give its children decent schooling, that to house its laborers as well as its horses was quite beyond its means, that the cost of the sanitation which would keep its people from needless disease was a burden impossible to be borne, that when the part of its income that it laid out through national channels rose to five hundred million dollars a year the country was on the way to bankruptcy, and that when this part reached a billion dollars it was a "rake's progress"! What a condemnation of the statesmanship of the later Gladstonian era is contained in the little fact we learn from Sir Charles Dilke's Life, that, on the preparation of each successive budget, it was quite the customary thing for the Chancellor of the Exchequer, whoever he was, to threaten to resign merely because the estimates would go up.

When we remember how large a proportion of our people were then being demoralized and degraded, racked by preventable disease and driven into premature graves, as a result of the inequality of circumstance that these statesmen refused to mitigate because they thought the nation positively could not afford to spend a few millions a year, we are wrong if we conclude that these men were specially ignorant of national finance. It was their bias against any reduction of the incomes of the property-owners that overcame their intellects, as it overcomes the intellects of many among their successors today. The spokesmen of the British Labor party on these matters were, as all the world now recognizes, right, not because they were better informed or more capable financiers, but because their bias kept them straight. This is the justification for a Labor party.

But rightness of aim, kept straight by a bias that happens to coincide with the nation's needs, will not of itself secure the desired results. The British Labor party must have, not only the right purpose, but also the right measures; and this means brains and training. It is altogether admirable, therefore, that its leader, Mr. Henderson, should have made his appeal to those younger men who have enjoyed the advantages of a wider education than the workman can secure, and of a training other than that of life at the forge, to come into the Labor party, and work side by side with the trade union leaders, within Parliament and without, at the social and economic problems with which it has to grapple.

SIDNEY WEBB.

CORRESPONDENCE

Praise from France

SIR: I wish to express to you my admiration for the attitude taken by your magazine during the present struggle. Among the sickening, inane, and senseless vaporings of the American press your clear saneness stands out like a beacon. There is thought and justice in every word I have read in your pages—there is a realization of the great forces at work and the seriousness of America's part in the war—and I can say this: You are voicing in no uncertain terms the views of the strong, virile men on whom the burden is to fall. Keep it up, and don't get bluffed out, we over here want two things: 1. Every force in America turned to win the war; 2. The ruthless destruction of selfish interests which may seek to prolong it needlessly.

D. E. HARROWER.

American Ambulance in France.

"Lines Long and Short"

SIR: Your review of Amy Lowell's Modern Tendencies of American Poetry singularly fails to emphasize the omission of Vachel Lindsay from the pages of that book. But there is another omission which will grow more conspicuous with time. Miss Lowell nowhere hints at the existence of Henry B. Fuller. His book, Lines Long and Short, had as well not be in existence for aught that Miss Lowell's recognition is concerned. Lines Long and Short contains passages of lyrical beauty which if not as Shelleyan as the best work of Sandburg, are surpassed in melodic intensity in no other quarter. And as for the gift of story telling no one in America equals him. In character drawing, in delicate irony with the saving grace of human sympathy, in condensation of style Lines Long and Short is an achievement which will never be forgotten. As for tendency, why may not this book be the genesis of a new form—the telling of the quintessence of human experiences in a medium which is neither prose nor verse, but is better than either?

W. B. THOMPSON.

Chicago, Illinois.

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Books and Things

EARLY in the autumn of 1914 we were all discovering, not without surprise, how grotesquely our idea of France had travestied the reality. Among these before-the-war misjudgments the queerest I can recall was the declaration of a headmaster, who rather regretted that so many more hours were given in his school to French than to German. The French, it seemed, were an immoral people. On hearing this I supposed a reference to sex was intended, but I was wrong. The headmaster was thinking of the frequency and carelessness with which the French said mon Dieu. A bolder spirit than mine would have asked why this gave him more offense than Gott im Himmel or Herr Jesu, but I didn't dare.

Cautiously, however, I did try to find out the sources from which he had drawn his knowledge of France. He had not read a new French book, except the Life of Pasteur in an English translation, for several years. In an earlier and more adventurous period he had, however, done a good deal of French. He could remember a few titles—La Petite Fadette, Les Trois Mousquetaires, Télémaque, Eugénie Grandet, Bossuet's funeral orations, Tartarin. His favorite French authors were André Theuriet and—well, he found it hard to say offhand. Besides, he seriously doubted whether knowledge of a country could best be derived from books. Unable himself to visit Paris except at long intervals, he depended chiefly upon friends who resided there, and who returned to the United States from time to time. It was when I heard this that I understood his point of view. You know the kind of American residents he had been exposed to. When Christopher Newman went to Paris for the first time he happened to meet his old acquaintance Tristram, an American who lived there. Mr. Tristram kindly offered to show Newman whatever Paris contained of most worth while. "I can show you some clever people, too," he added. "Do you know General Packard? Do you know Miss Kitty Upjohn? Do you know C. P. Hatch?" Henry James wrote The American nearly forty years ago, yet the race of Tristrams lived on until the war. Many of my friend the headmaster's friends, of the persons he went to for insights into France, were Tristram's legitimate descendants.

Really, though, I don't know what right I have to be supercilious. My friend's misunderstanding of France was gained by methods certain to produce misunderstanding, but were the methods I followed likely to produce anything else? Even though I was incapable of both reading Pasteur's life and also making a mon Dieu generalization, yet had I not been almost as foolish?

When I was last in Paris, in the spring of 1914, I saw a Franco-Prussian war play. It was either written by Alphonse Daudet, or else a Daudet story dramatized, and it was patriotic. A very old soldier, who had fought as a boy under Napoleon, had lived on into the war of 1870. His granddaughter, afraid that bad news might kill him, had succeeded in keeping him ignorant of the Prussian victories. Feeble in body and mind, believing everything his granddaughter told him, unable to leave his flat and hear what every one was saying on the streets of Paris besieged, he was waiting for the return of the conquering French armies, for their glorious march past his window. One day, early in the spring of 1871, the old man heard music. Not until he had dragged himself to the window, not until his eyes saw the Germans triumphant in Paris, did he learn the truth. And the truth killed him.

At the time I did not much enjoy this play. Here, it seemed to me, the patriotic note was forced, patriotism looked at itself in the glass, the sentimentalist caressed his wounds and pointed them out to us. But suppose I had been enabled to see ahead, on that spring evening in 1914, and to feel what I foresaw? Well, many of the French men and women in that theatre needed no gift of prophecy. They had only to remember.

And yet that Daudet play, as I look back on it now, now when France's greatness of soul has been revealed to us all by this war, and when the word French has for all of us lost and gained so many meanings—that Daudet play seems strangely un-French. So, to be sure, does the modern French theatre, the plays one saw on any visit to Paris fifteen years ago, or ten or five. Of course they were French enough in some ways. Hervieu was French in his effort to express everything which reason could infer from the data in his chosen situation, and to express nothing else. It was a French eye, amused and tolerant, that Capus turned toward the most everyday traits of the most everyday life, just as it was a French hand that combined these traits without deforming them into La Veine or Les Deux Ecoles. His wit was French, and Donnay's wit was as French and as unemphatic as his irony and wistful amorism, or as the grace of his words, which no one who did not love the speech of France could have made into such speakable little melodies. Lavedan was French when he was satirical, when he was goody-goody, when he declaimed. But how was a foreigner, even though he added these men to all the other French playwrights whom I have left out, how was an outsider to make from such a total anything but the incompletest picture of France, and false in its incompleteness? It is another France, as quick-witted, more intelligent, nobler and simpler, that has fought this war.

How stupid of me, knowing that I knew France mostly by going to the theatre in Paris and by reading French novels, ever to have been surprised by the discovery that I did not know France at all! Three years ago I realized part of my ignorance. I began to judge the past by the present. France never was the country her dramatists and novelists showed us. From no such France as theirs could the France which fights this war have sprung, short of a miracle greater than any the war has worked. There has been no miracle, no break in the sequence. Even in the France which misrepresented herself more gravely, at the time of the Dreyfus case, than we in our blindness had misrepresented her, there existed the presiding minds, the widespread clearness of soul, the million fortitudes and courages and high resolves, which the war has heightened and used and made known.

Meeting my friend the headmaster the other day, when he came down to New York from his school in Pennsylvania, I was reminded of all this, and tried to recall forgotten states of mind. In this exercise the headmaster gave me no help. He did not remember ever believing that the French said mon Dieu too often. And I could not help being glad that France had altered less than he supposed. Even now, when we all realize that the steel in the French character, tempered by more than three years of war, was always there, always ready for war to temper it, even now the French are also what they seemed. Their gaiety is not extinct. They are still lucid lovers of reason, witty, ironical, light of hand. These qualities will manifest themselves again when the war is over. But we shall not be led astray again, not again mistake the bright surfaces for the whole.

P. L.

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The Green Mirror

The Green Mirror, by Hugh Walpole. New York: G. H. Doran Co. $1.50.

IT is strange that Mr. Walpole should describe his novel as old-fashioned and uneventful, simply because it was finished in August, 1914. The war may change many things, break up many of the moated English homes of which he has chosen an example, it barely touches the instincts that are in leash behind the portcullis of the family. Parents and children are going to remain parents and children. The outsider who falls in love with a favorite daughter is still going to challenge everything that is anxious or imperious in the natures of father and mother, as well as everything that gives them pride in their tradition and zest in their habits. The terms on which a new person may be incorporated into a family are not confined to any class or race. They may vary for Jews and Gentiles, white and yellow; their source is a psychology common to all. What Mr. Walpole has so fully and sensitively absorbed in a case that is perfect of its kind remains essentially undisturbed by storm and wreck on the surface. The character, the exigencies, of the great compromise of the family are too permanent to be called unfashionable because of the war.

The excellence of Mr. Walpole's novel depends largely on the fact that his mind is not saturated with the newspapers. If he has come to give us the Trenchards it is not because his ears are ringing with birth control, eugenics, the Oedipus complex, sex education, the equal standard, freedom for women, and the rest. Young Mark, the intruder who loves Katherine Trenchard, "isn't quite an Englishman, you know. Been abroad so long." But everything that makes him different, that clashes him against Mrs. Trenchard and Aunt Aggie and Glebeshire and Garth, that makes him ruffle the English lawn, is summed up in his affinity for Russia. It is, of course, a symbol. His former mistress Anna, of Moscow, is also almost a symbol—a suggestion of that other self in Philip Mark which is just utterly impossible to the teak-like solidity, imperviousness, staunchness of the Trenchard stock. One may say that Russia could not, after all—even to a man so tremulously imaginative as Philip can be—represent such a loose invitingness as its merest mention appears to extend to him. But Russia is, at any rate, a fine name for all that expansiveness of human nature, that uncalculating life, at which a Trenchard jerks away like a decerebrated frog from an electric shock. It expresses in a term of actuality something that would otherwise have the shrillness of a theory untried.

Philip's relinquishment of Russia and Anna, his accidental visit to the Trenchards in London, the blooming of love between himself and the treasurable English Katherine—these early steps of The Green Mirror are taken with the security of one who writes what he abundantly knows. The beginning is self-conscious and overwrought, but Mr. Walpole is too good a novelist to keep niggling with his material; and when he warms up he writes with a master's resource. He is after the real thing in his novel, the account of personal significances in a situation that is knowable and unforced in the ordinary run of human affairs. He builds for it honestly and admirably, and if it were not for a certain deep reluctance to assume too much authority in speaking of inexpressive English people, resulting in a psychological feebleness, The Green Mirror could stand up with the best. That feebleness, it seems to me, is immaturity. It is the one inadequacy in Mr. Walpole's revelation—a failure to dredge the depths of his well-imagined theme.

The figure of Mrs. Trenchard is the monumental figure of this novel. In her, an inexpressive and apparently commonplace woman, is concentrated all the jealous tenacity of a strong parent who is unwilling to let go her child. Her strength lies mainly in her ability, as the unsympathetic see it, to impose terms on the creative possibilities of those she loves, and she singles out the considerate Katherine as the person whose destiny she wills to govern. From the angle of parenthood, of course, there is more in it than that. When Katherine consents to be engaged for a year, she realizes the necessity of paying any reasonable price to hold her mother and the Trenchards, to win them to Phil. But the mother is like most dominant family-centered mothers, she has no ultimate respect for her daughter's will. She knows better than her daughter. And Katherine is forced in the end to break the adjustment that was forged for love through years. "How curious that Katherine should have been living during all those years of intimate affection with her mother and have thought of her never—no, never at all. She had taken her, her love, her little habits, her slow voice, her relentless determination, her 'managing'—all these things and many more—as though they had been inevitably outside argument, statement or gratitude. But now, simply because of the division that there was between them, she saw her as a marvelous woman, the strangest mingling of sweetness and bitterness, of tenderness and hardness, of unselfishness and relentless egoism. She saw this, suddenly, standing there in the doorway, and the imminent flash of it struck her for an instant with great fear. Then she saw Philip and gained her courage."

Mrs. Trenchard's blithe evasive husband likes Philip, rather. "A nice young fellow, nice and clean and healthy—not too cocksure, either, although he's clever." But Mrs. Trenchard is immovable in her dislike. "'I don't like him,' said Mrs. Trenchard again. 'I could never like him. He isn't a religious man. He has a bad effect upon Henry. You, Katherine, to accept him when you know that he doesn't go to church and was so rude to poor Mr. Seymour and thinks Russia such a fine country! I can't think,' said Mrs. Trenchard, her hands trembling again, 'what's come over you.'"

But why is Mrs. Trenchard immovable in her dislike? Mr. Walpole shows beautifully how Mrs. Trenchard refuses to take the offensive when the Anna episode reaches her ears. A novel that explains how such an explosive can be rejected after so terrible a campaign is doing handsome work in the exposition of personalities; and there is no violation of that exposition in having the desperate valor of Katie break the deadlock, and thus foil the mother's (enslaving) tolerance. Katie sees that her family cannot be won. She emancipates Phil by renouncing the mother to whom he is conceding his independence. She accepts the episode of Anna, everything, out of a real love. But why, in the end, this relentlessness on the part of Mrs. Trenchard? That is the point on which the reader does want to be convinced.

"The world's going to be for the young and the independent and the unprejudiced, not the old and narrow-minded." That's one moral to derive from the situation, but a shallow moral. There is much more in the fight of a mother like Mrs. Trenchard than conservatism bristling at a new age.

Mr. Walpole's failure, or refusal, to indicate the sources

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of conflict with the newcomer is not a defect in his vivid and beautiful story-telling. It is plainly a remission of that psychologic purpose which such a novel as his demands. In what degree is conformity to such parents as Mrs. Trenchard possible? Why do such parents refuse to negotiate their peace? The quest for good reasons in a case like this is one of the things that leads a person to read a novel. It is, manifestly, largely what a novel is for.

The exploration of a Mrs. Trenchard should very likely go deeper into her will to power than Mr. Walpole has traveled. It should make unsparing use of all the knowledge that is now really a weapon against every human imperialism and every tyranny that masquerades as love. The family is so much the reservoir of egoisms that in the relation of parents and children one may well be less cordial, less patient, than Mr. Walpole has been—not because one resents either parent or child, or favors or disfavors the lover, but because there is an explanation to be offered that, better than the accusation of monopoly or conservatism, does explain.

Still, The Green Mirror, a little inadequate as to Anna and Katherine, a little mechanical as to Phil, has not one touch of aniline in all its warm colors and rich presences and faithful portraiture. It is a fine novel, grappling bravely with the great ironies of mother-love.

F. H.

Aristo-democracy

Aristo-democracy, by Sir Charles Waldstein. New York: Longmans Green & Co. $3.50.

THE appraisal of this book is an extraordinarily difficult task. It is clearly the work of a man who has thought carefully upon the problems of government. It is full of acute but scattered reflections. It shows wide reading and generous sympathies. But it lacks the logical cohesion of a mature mind. It is not the work of a man who can pin himself down to sober analysis. It is full of aerial flights which are essentially tangential in character. And its main thesis is a curiously incoherent idealism at no stage bottomed upon the basis of political reality.

The object of Sir Charles Waldstein is to show that the main cause of this war is the absence of a common ideal among civilized nations. We lack, he says, "a faith in which we believe wholeheartedly, and which can not only lead us on to action, to great things, noble enterprise, complete self-sacrifice, but will also regulate our actions even in the smallest demands of daily life." It is surely evident that not merely do we indeed lack such a faith, but that its possession is completely undesirable. A faith which could demand so rigorous a uniformity as this would sap the spontaneity out of civilization. Sir Charles suggests its registration into a code; but he must surely know that the real well-springs of good conduct lie deeper than the pleasant phrases of ethical inquiry. I cannot help doubting whether any student has been made a better man by the careful perusal of say Dewey and Tufts' Text-book of Ethics. A code such as is here suggested would either be so vague as to be useless, or so detailed as to be a fertile source of impossible irritation. The simple fact is that we cannot codify the internal springs of conduct; and those, whether we like it or not, are the real source of external action. The latter we can in some rough sort divide into right or wrong; and the customs of international law are an attempt to provide such a criterion of external conduct.

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But the fundamental truth remains that civilization is very largely an internal convention; and men will obey its practices less by reason of the sanctions it employs than by the fact that its acceptance has been bred into our bone. But the history of Germany in the course of this war has emphasized its basis in the internal will.

Where Sir Charles Waldstein passes to an analysis of the conditions of modern Germany he has far more of value to contribute. He understands the significance for the modern world of that immense corporate effort which raised a congeries of petty principalities into an unified and prosperous nation. He does, indeed, make serious mistakes. Governmental decentralization is not responsible for the spread of the Germanic idea; had there been an effective decentralization in Germany, Prussian domination would not have had its way. The truth is that in fundamental things the German government is in no real sense federalized. There is localization not of intentions but of execution; so that while the shadow of power remains, its substance has in fact not been conceded. Similarly it is a misreading of the facts to represent the ideas of Treitschke as the main nourishment of the German people. The circulation of his Politik, against which alone can any protest be made, was curiously small; and its political purpose is no more obvious than the purpose of a book like Seeley's Expansion of England which lies, partially at any rate, at the root of the South African war. Lord Acton's appreciation of Treitschke, which Sir Charles professes himself unable to understand, will become perfectly intelligible to him if he will compare it with Macaulay's history. It is worth while insisting that Green's Short History started a new tradition when it insisted that there

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are other things to be told of England than the record of military adventure.

Sir Charles's comments on America are very largely a repetition of some opinions of Mr. Lowes Dickinson. Americans, so we are told, are very greatly anxious for the preservation of English culture simply because it does not exist in America. Now no one can doubt that there are all kinds of deficiencies in the intellectual outlook of the average American citizen. Far too much stress may here be laid on information as against wisdom, on the practical man as against the whole man, on commerce as against art. America has not convinced one Englishman at least of the inferiority of Oxford. But in all seriousness it has convinced him that the average American is infinitely more in earnest about education than the average Englishman. He is infinitely more interested in his schools, infinitely more generous to his universities. It is true enough that the American university is inferior in what is broadly called humanism to Oxford and Cambridge. There is no such love of life as a whole in Yale or Princeton or Columbia as one can find in the older foundations. The love of specialized information has grown morbid to the point of disaster. But people who, like Sir Charles, are anxious about the decline in manners, the stain on morals implied in American commercial standards, the beatification of the practical and the rest, ought not to make their comparison with Oxford and Cambridge. They are, so to speak, oases in an English desert. The real comparison is with Edinburgh and Manchester, London and Liverpool; and I would hazard the guess that their ideals are not in substance different from those of the great American universities. The English provincial undergraduates can be found any day in Chicago and Madison and Urbana; just as the typical American business man can be found in the city of London. Sir Charles is dealing with universal types and classes; and where he follows Mr. Lowes Dickinson he misunderstands the essence of his problem.

That, as his cumbersome title implies, is the evolution of a democratic government associated with the traditional virtues of an aristocracy. But the way in which Sir Charles has set out to analyze this problem is useless for any effective purpose. He may quote as he will the great maxims of Christ and Plato and Moses. He may insist on the educability of the workers as evidenced by university extension classes. He may urge that the teaching of ethics will effect a revolution in the standards of public morals. He may demonstrate the ethical effectiveness of Free Trade. All of these things are true and yet none of them touch the central problem. You do not answer the complex problems of the modern state by a series of stately aphorisms or the cherished memory of great men. Within twenty years careful analyses like Sedgwick's Elements of Politics become obsolete. The problems of government today are of a different kind.

They are largely problems in technique and in the discovery of the will that lies behind the technique. Of that will Mr. Veblen has given us a partial picture in his brilliant essay on the leisure class. Mr. Graham Wallas has analyzed its mental content in two already classic books. Those who wish to help us at this stage of political philosophy must be thoroughly acquainted with the work that has been performed. Sir Charles Waldstein's volume comes with fragrant memories of the eighteenth century and the perfectibility of man; but between the eighteenth century and our own time there is a gulf too wide for even the most generous intentions to bridge unless it is equipped with the adequate knowledge. H. J. L.

Recent Publications

The "Fortnightly" History of the War, by Colonel A. M. Murray, C.B., M.V.O., Vol. 1. New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co. $3.00.

THE present volume takes us from the beginning of the war down to July 18, 1916, when the British offensive on the Somme had already scored its initial successes and Brusiloff had reason to believe he could clear the enemy out of Galicia by the end of the year. Since then the western front has become the major theatre of war. Col. Murray is optimistic concerning a final military decision there, although naturally in this volume more emphasis is put upon help from the east than can ever be used again. Probably today he would counterbalance Russia's practical withdrawal by American intervention. The author has rigorously limited himself to a purely military history, mentioning only those political and economic factors which have had a direct bearing on military affairs. But even a military history has to take into account the factor of morale, and Colonel Murray shows how time and again—principally on the western front—the advantage on this score was all with the French and English. Reckless phalanx attacks directed by Prussian officers, who would not assess at its true cost the sacrifice of men, recoiled on their own heads. Colonel Murray has written an accurate, terse and shrewdly perceptive military history of the war during its first two bloody years.

Culture and Ethnology, by Robert H. Lowie. New York: Douglas C. McMurtrie.

THE intelligent layman should have no difficulty in acquiring from this book Dr. Lowie's point that "culture," as the dominating idea in modern ethnological science, embraces a body of facts which cannot be accounted for by psychological principles or historical interpretation. "Culture," the ethnologist uses in the sense of "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society." These socially acquired traits, modified and combined, persist in the same group and pass from group to group almost as if with an independent life of their own. Customs, techniques, ideas, overlap racial boundaries, defy environment, move or remain stagnant in ways apparently incalculable. "In northern Arizona, the Hopi Indians occupying three eminences not more than eight miles distant from one another have no perfect uniformity of industrial knowledge," although "conditions more ideal *a priori* for a transfer of knowledge than among the practically homogeneous neighboring Hopi groups could not be conceived." The Japanese have taken over bodily the industrial and scientific technique of the markedly alien western peoples. Such facts cannot be explained in terms of psychology, racial differences, or geographical environment. The ethnologist, therefore, finds the determinants for cultural facts only in terms of other cultural facts, that is in terms of their diffusion by means of the contact of groups, their assimilation and propagation, their mere survival and inertia. "Pattern" and "provenance" are the clues the ethnologist finds to the confusion of facts. "Culture" becomes a closed system of data, amenable to scientific ordering.

Such a conception leaves one, however, with the ques-

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tion whether cultural facts do not need to be touched a little with the newer psychology of the innate dispositions and strivings of the individual, in order to make ethnology of real significance to the "intelligent layman." Does not our interpretation of cultural facts need to be fertilized with a knowledge of what satisfactions or repressions or liberations each custom gives expression to? Can ethnology afford to operate in a vacuum without a touch of, say, Nietzsche and Freud? Can the ethnologist hope to mould his knowledge on the strict lines of physical science without the taint of philosophy, and, if he does, will it be anything more than a game? One wonders all the more, because just as Dr. Lowie gets his theory admirably expounded, he trails off, by way of illustration, into a long and very technical chapter on "terms of relationship," which is like nothing so much as a higher mathematics of culture. The "intelligent layman" would probably see more through having the ethnological theory illustrated in some contemporaneous social situation.

The Terror, a Mystery, by Arthur Machen, New York: Robert M. McBride & Co. $1.25.

LONG before the war Mr. Machen wrote The Hill of Dreams, full of subterranean radiance, hallucinated beauty, and a twilight of dream skies slowly darkening to insanity. To read it was to share the emotions of a mind subtly invaded by mystery, driven from our rougher ocean of reality into an inland sea. But Mr. Machen's attention has been divided by the war, which hangs over The Terror like an unassimilated background. For the plot has really nothing to do with the war. The horrors that mark the animals' sudden war upon mankind seem isolated from their cause, and do not convince one of any real terror at the root of them. And even Mr. Machen seems unconvinced, as if the bright bubble of his phantasy had been punctured, and his inner world had vanished away. In spite of the disappointment, and the defect of a good idea not vigorously carried out, The Terror is a distinguished book, and bears the mark of a strangely original mind.

A Daughter of the Morning, by Zona Gale. Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill. $1.40.

THE author fails in her ambition to create a new type. Cosma Wakely, the heroine, in the opening of the book, appears as a quaintly candid country girl, with no outlook or vision of life. In the process of transition from the ignorant country girl to a student of a university in the city she loses her individuality. The superficial philosophy and the weak love interest may appeal to the sentimental high school girl. But the note of protest against the sterility and lack of promise that country life offers to a girl redeems the book from many of its faults.

Contributors

to this issue

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